S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1

CASE NOTE

Bench Composition

• Justice S. R. Pandian
• Justice A. M. Ahmadi
• Justice J. S. Verma
• Justice Yogeshwar Dayal
• Justice Kuldip Singh
• Justice P. B. Sawant
• Justice Katikithala Ramaswamy
• Justice B. P. Jeevan Reddy
• Justice S. C. Agrawal

The judgment comprises of six opinions authored by Justice Pandian, Justice Ahmadi, Justice Verma (for himself and Justice Dayal), Justice Sawant (for himself and Justice Kuldip Singh), Justice Ramaswamy, and Justice Jeevan Reddy (for himself and Justice Agarwal)

Facts

Civil Appeal No. 3635 of 1989[1] (Karnataka)

S.R. Bommai was the Chief Minister of Karnataka, who was sworn in after the resignation of R.K.Hegde. As on 01.02.1989, Bommai’s party Janta Dal had 111 members, Congress had 65 members and Janta Party had 27 members in the 225 seat assembly. Due to certain dissatisfaction over expansion of ministry, one Kalyan Molakery and along with few others defected from Janta Dal. He wrote letters on April 17 and 18, 1989 to the Governor enclosing the letters of 19 others expressing want of confidence in Shri Bommai. On 19.04.1989, the Governor sent a report to the President. On 20.04.1989, 7 out of 19 MLAs that supported Kalyan Molakery, wrote to the Governor that their signatures were obtained by misrepresentation and reaffirmed their support to Shri Bommai. On the same day the cabinet also decided to convene the assembly session on 27.04.1989 at 3.30 p.m. to obtain vote of confidence. Thereafter, Shri Bommai met the Governor and requested him, to allow floor-test to prove his majority and he was prepared even to advance the date of the session. In this scenario the Governor sent his second report to the President. The President exercising the power under Article 356 issued Proclamation, dismissed Bommai Government, dissolved the Assembly on 21.04.1989 and assumed the administration of the State of Karnataka. When a writ petition was filed, a special Bench of three Judges of the High Court of Karnataka dismissed the writ petition. Thus this appeal was preferred before the Apex Court.

Transferred Case Nos. 5 and 7 of 1992[2] (Meghalaya)

The petitioner G.S.Massar, belonged to Hill Peoples’ Union, which along with several other State political parties and certain independent MLAs joined together to form a ‘Front’, known as Meghalaya United Parliamentary Party (MUPP). This Front had a majority in the Assembly and formed the Government headed by Shri B.B. Lyngdoh. On 25.07.1991, the then Speaker of the House, Shri P.R. Kyndiah Arthree was elected as the leader of the opposition group known as United Meghalaya Parliamentary Forum (UMPF), which was led by the Congress Party to which Shri Kyndiah belonged. He claimed the support of the majority of members in the House and requested the Governor to invite him to form the Government. Thereupon the Governor requested Shri Lyngdoh to prove his majority on the floor of the House. On 07.08.1991, a special session of the Assembly was convened to pass a motion of confidence in the Ministry. On the motion being moved, thirty members supported it and twenty-seven voted against it. Before announcing the result, however, the Speaker announced that he had received a complaint against five independent MLAs in the ruling coalition alleging disqualification under the Anti-defection Law and on 17.08.1991 the Speaker passed an order disqualifying all the 5 MLAs. On 06.09.1991, four of the said five MLAs approached this Court and obtained an interim order staying the operation of the orders of the Speaker dated 07.08.1991 and 17.08.1991. On coming to know of the order of this Court, the Speaker issued a press statement saying that he does not accept any interference by any court. He issued strict instructions to the security guards not to allow the said five members to enter the Assembly premises. After a brief interval and on the advice of the Governor, the Assembly was again summoned to meet on 08.10.1991. Meanwhile, a contempt petition was filed by the said four MLAs in Court against the Speaker. On 03.10.1991, Apex Court passed another order affirming that all authorities of the State including the Governor must ensure that the order of the Court dated 06.09.1991 is implemented. Accordingly, the said four independent MLAs were issued invitation to attend the session on 08.10.1991. 56 MLAs, including the said four, attended the session. After the motion of confidence in the Government was put to vote, the Speaker declared that 26 voted for the motion and 26 against. In counting the votes casted in favour of the motion, he excluded the votes of the said four independent MLAs again. Holding that there was a tie, he cast his vote against the motion and declared the motion lost. He then adjourned the House sine die. The thirty, MLAs (including the said four independent MLAS) however, continued to stay in the House. They elected a Speaker from among themselves, who found on a scrutiny of the records relating to voting on the motion of confidence that actually 30 members have signed in favour of the motion and 26 against. Accordingly, he declared that the motion of confidence in the Government was carried. The said 30 MLAs thereafter sent a letter to the Governor affirming that they had voted in favour of the Government and also in favour of the motion of no confidence in the Speaker. In’ spite of all this, the Chief Minister received a letter dated October 9, 1991 from the Governor advising him to resign in view of the proceedings of the Assembly dated October 8, 1991. Immediately, thereupon, the Chief Minister approached the Supreme Court and the Court passed the following order : “Since the matter is extremely urgent, we deem it fit to pass this further order asking the Governor while taking any decision on the question whether the Government has lost the motion of confidence and lost its majority in the House, to take into account, the two earlier orders dated September 6, 1991 and October 3, 1991 of this Court and also to take into account how the aforesaid four appellants had cast their vote.” However, the President of India proceeded to issue a Proclamation under Article 356 on 11.10.1991. He dismissed the Government and dissolved the Assembly. Meanwhile, a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court vide order dated 12.10.1991 set aside the order of the Speaker dated August 17, 1989. However, thereafter, both Houses of Parliament duly met and approved the Proclamation.

Civil Appeal Nos. 193-94 of 1989[3] (Nagaland)

At the relevant time, the Nagaland Assembly consisted of 60 members, 34 belonged to Congress I, 18 to Naga National Democratic Party, one belonged to Naga Peoples Party and 7 were independent. Shri Sema, the leader of the ruling party was the Chief Minister heading the State Government. On 28.07.1988, 13 out of the 34 MLAs of the ruling Congress I Party informed the Speaker of the Assembly that they had formed a party separate from Congress I ruling party and requested him for allotment of separate seats for them in the House. The session was to commence on August 28, 1988. By his decision of July 30, 1988, the Speaker held that there was a split in the party within the meaning of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. On July 31, 1988, Shri Vamuzo, one of the 13 defecting MLAs who had formed a separate party, informed the Governor that he commanded the support of 35 out of the then 59 members in the Assembly and was in a position to form the Government. On October 1988, the Chief Secretary of the State wrote to Shri Vamuzo that according to his information, Shri Vamuzo had wrongfully confined the MLAs who had formed the new party. Shri Vamuzo denied the said allegation and asked the Chief Secretary to verify the truth from the members themselves. On verification, the members told the Chief Secretary that none of them was confined, as alleged. On August 6, 1988, the Governor sent a report to the President of India about the formation of a new party by the 13 MLAS. He also stated that the said MLAs were allured by money. He further stated that the said MLAs were kept in forcible confinement by Shri Vamuzo and one other person, and that the story of split in the ruling party was not true. He added that the Speaker was hasty in according recognition to the new group of the 13 members and commented that horse-trading was going on in the State. He made a special reference to the insurgency in Nagaland and also stated that some of the members of the Assembly were having contacts with the insurgents. He expressed the apprehension that if the affairs were allowed to continue as they were, it would affect the stability of the State. In the meanwhile, the Chief Minister submitted his resignation to the Governor and recommended the imposition of the President’s rule. The President thereafter, issued the impugned Proclamation and dismissed the Government and dissolved the Assembly. Shri Vamuzo, the leader of the new group challenged the validity of the Proclamation in the Gauhati High Court. The petition was heard by a Division Bench comprising the Chief Justice and Hansaria, J. The Bench differed on the effect and operation of Article 74(2) and hence the matter was referred to the third Judge. But before the third learned Judge could hear the matter, the Union of India moved this Court for grant of special leave which was granted and the proceedings in the High Court were stayed.

 Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh

Elections were held to the Legislative Assemblies in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh along with the elections to the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh, in February 1990. The Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) secured majority in the Assemblies of all the four States and formed Governments there. Following appeals of some organisations including the BJP, thousands of kar sevaks from Uttar Pradesh as well as from other States including Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh gathered near the Ram Janam Bhumi-Babri Masjid structure on December 6, 1992 and eventually some of them demolished the disputed structure. Following the demolition, on the same day the Uttar Pradesh Government resigned. Thereafter, on the same day the President issued Proclamation under Article 356(1) and dissolved the Legislative Assembly of the State. The said Proclamation was not challenged.

As a result of the demolition of the structure, there were violent reactions in the country. This in turn created further reactions in country resulting in violence and destruction of the property. The Union Government tried to cope up with the situation by taking several steps including a ban on several organisations including Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Bajrang Dal which had along with BJP given a call for kar sevaks to march towards Ayodhya on December 6, 1992. The ban order was issued on December 10, 1992 under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. [4]The dismissal of the State Governments and the State Legislative Assemblies in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh were admittedly a consequence of these developments and were effected by the issuance of Proclamations under Article 356(1), all on December 15, 1992.

Civil Appeal Nos. Nos. 1692-A-1692-C of 1993, 4627-30 of 1993 (M.P.)[5]

On 08.12.1992, the Governor of Madhya Pradesh sent a report to the President setting out the deteriorating law and order situation in the State in the wake of widespread acts of violence, arson and looting. He observed in his report that “the lack of faith in the ability of the State Government to stem the tide primarily because of the political leadership’s overt and covert support to the associate communal organisations seem to point out that there is breakdown of the administrative machinery of the State”. He followed it up with another report on 10.12.1992 wherein he mentioned about the violence spreading to hitherto peaceful areas. On 13.12.1992, he sent his third report enclosing the photocopy of a letter received from the Executive Director, Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL), Bhopal. The said letter indicated the “abject failure of the law and order machinery to provide safety and security to life and property in the areas in and around BHEL factory”. The letter also spoke of “the pressure brought on the administration to accommodate the so-called kar sevaks in BHEL area”. The Governor termed them as extremely serious developments that deserve a high- level probe. The third report further questioned the State Government’s credibility to sincerely implement the Center’s direction regarding ban of the organisations like RSS, VHP etc. The Governor recommended that “considering this and looked in the background of the RSS, etc., contemplating on a fresh strategy to chalk out its future plan and the possibility of the leaders of the banned organisations going underground taking advantage of the soft reaction of the Administration have reasons to be convinced that there should not be any further delay in imposition of President’s rule according to Article 356 of the Constitution of India”.

Transferred Case No. 8 of 1993 (Himachal Pradesh)[6]

The Proclamation issued by the President succeeded the report of the Governor of Himachal Pradesh which was sent to him on 15.12.1992. In his report the Governor had stated that, inter-alia, that the Chief Minister and his Cabinet had instigated kar sevaks from Himachal Pradesh to participate in the kar seva at Ayodhya. Not only that, but some of the Ministers had expressed their desire publicly to participate in kar seva if the party high-command permitted them to do so. As a result, a number of kar sevaks including some BJP MLAs participated in the kar seva at Ayodhya. A member of the Legislative Assembly belonging to the ruling BJP had also openly stated that he had participated in the demolition of the Babri Masjid. The Governor then added that Chief Minister, Shri Shanta Kumar had met him on 13.12.1992 and had informed him that he desired to implement the ban orders imposed by the Government of India on RSS, VHP and three other organisations and that he had already issued directions in that behalf. The Governor, however, opined that since the Chief Minister himself was a member of RSS, he was not in a position to implement the directions honestly and effectively and that most of the people in the State felt the same way. He also stated that some of the Ministers were publicly criticising the ban on the said organisations and when the Chief Ministers and some of his colleagues in the Ministry were members of the RSS, it was not possible for the administrative machinery to implement the ban honestly and effectively. It is on the basis of this report that the Proclamation in question was issued.

Transferred Case No. 9 of 1993 (Rajasthan)[7]

The report of the Governor of Rajasthan, recommending imposition of the President’s rule, stated the following facts: the Government of Rajasthan has played ‘an obvious role’ in the Ayodhya episode. The BJP has control over RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal which are now banned by the Centre. The said ban is not being implemented at all. Indeed, one of the Ministers had resigned and along with 22 MLAs and 15,500 BJP workers had participated in the kar seva at Ayodhya on December 12, 1992. They were given a royal send off and when they returned, they were given a similar royal welcome by the influential people in the political set-up running the Government. The law and order has been very bad for more than a week, the dominant character being the anti-minority with atrocities against the minorities being committed. The administration could not function effectively under the present political set-up. He expressed the apprehension that it would be extremely difficult to expect the administration to function objectively, effectively and in accordance with the rule of law and that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

Legislative History of Article 356

A provision akin to Article 356 existed under S.45 and S. 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which empowered the Governor to issue proclamation and assume the powers of the provincial government or authority. Section 93 of the 1935 Act provided that if a Governor of a province was satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the province cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the said Act, he could, by proclamation, assume to himself all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by a provincial body or authority including the Ministry and the Legislature and to discharge those functions in his discretion.[8]

The 1935 Act contemplated, for the first time, delegation of certain powers of governance to the Ministries formed by Indian political parties and constitution of Legislatures elected, no doubt, on a restricted franchise. The British Government were not inclined to trust these Ministries even with limited powers, probably, in view of the fact that not only the political parties in India were ambiguous regarding entering the Legislatures and Ministries created under the said Act but some of them were also proclaiming that even if they entered the Ministries they would try to break the governments from within.[9] Thus, the purpose of S.93 was clearly to make provision for resumption of power, if the Governor felt that any ministry in the Province is working against the interest of the Crown. S.93 was widely used by the colonial powers to satisfy the said purpose.[10]

Following their bitter experience with S.93 of the 1935 Act, many members of Constituent Assembly strongly opposed inclusion of similar provision in the Indian Constitution. Dr. Ambedkar pacified the members by stating:[11]

“In fact I share the sentiments expressed that the proper thing we ought to expect is that such articles will never be called into operation and that they would remain a dead letter. If at all, they are brought into operation, I hope the President, who is endowed with all these powers, will take proper precautions before actually Suspending the administration of the provinces. I hope the first thing he ‘will do would be to issue a mere warning to a province that has erred, that things were not happening in the way in which they were intended to happen in the Constitution.”

He also hoped that this provision “will never be called into operation” and “would remain a dead letter”.[12] Similar opinion was also expressed by Shri Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, who stated that we are in grave and difficult times and this provision would be required to deal with emergent situations.[13] There was also conflict of views amongst the members as to whether the Governor can exercise his power without consulting the council of ministers. It was eventually decided by the assembly leadership that the Governor could in emergencies act in his discretion while communicating it to the President.[14] Thus, the intent of the Constituent Assembly was that this provision was to be used sparingly and in extremely emergent circumstances, that too after giving a warning to the erring state government.

Principal Issues before the Nine Judges Bench

1. Whether the President has unfettered powers to issue Proclamation under Article 356(1) of the Constitution?
2. Is the Proclamation amenable to judicial review?
3. If yes, what is the scope of the judicial review in this respect?
4. What is the meaning of the expression “a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution” used in Article 356(1)?

Ratio of the Bommai Case

SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

The first and the foremost question before the constitution bench was whether a proclamation issued under Article 356 can be judicially reviewed. Every member of the nine-judges bench agreed that Presidential proclamation issued under Article 356 of the Constitution is not completely beyond judicial review. However, there was disagreement as to the scope and extent of judicial review.

In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Union of India [15] also, the seven-judges constitution bench had held that exercise of power under Article 356 was amenable to judicial review. However, majority opinion of the bench was that there is extremely narrow scope of judicial review and if the satisfaction is mala fide or is based on wholly extraneous and irrelevant grounds, only then the Court would have jurisdiction to examine it. The bench also considered Article 356(5) which made the exercise of power Article 356(1) non-justiciable. It was held that though it would not entirely bar judicial review but it would certainly restrict the ambit of judicial review.

Later, after deletion of 356(5), a five judges-bench in A.K. Roy v. Union of India[16] observed that any observations made in the State of Rajasthan case on the basis of clause (5) cannot any longer hold good.

In the Bommai Case, the widest scope of judicial review has been laid down by Justices Sawant & Kuldeep Singh. They have held in their judgment that democracy and federalism are the essential features of the constitution and while exercising the power under Article 356, the president and the council of ministers have the capacity to emasculate these two basic features. Thus, it is necessary to closely scrutinize the material on the basis of which the advice is given to the president and the President forms his satisfaction. The court has to perform the task of judicial review while confining itself within the parameters of illegality, irrationality and mala fides.[17]

They opined that the observations made in A.K. Roy case[18] imply that after the deletion of clause (5), the judicial review of the Proclamation issued under Article 356(1) has become wider than indicated in the State Of Rajasthan case.[19] Justices Jeevan Reddy and S.C. Agrawal have also observed that deletion of 356(5) is significant as the express bar created in the way of judicial review has been removed consciously and deliberately by the legislature and the thus the cloud cast on the power of judicial review has been lifted.[20]

In State of Rajasthan Case, the court found that it would be difficult to examine the action under Article 356(1) when Article 74(2) lays down that “the question whether any, and if so, what advice was tendered by the Ministers to the President, shall not be inquired into in any court”. Relying on this, the key contention of the Union was that disclosure of reasons and material would amount to disclosure of advice, which is expressly barred by Article 74(2) of the Constitution.

Justices Sawant & Kuldeep Singh found this argument to be fallacious and observed that the object of Article 74(2) was not to exclude any material or documents from the scrutiny of the courts. Its objective is to ensure that an order issued by or in the name of the President could not be challenged on the ground that it was either contrary to the advice tendered by the Ministers or was issued without obtaining any advice from the Ministers. The object of Article 74(2) is merely to make the question whether the President had followed the advice of the Ministers or acted contrary thereto, non-justiciable. Thus, the advice, tendered by the Ministers to the President has been kept beyond the scrutiny of the court.[21] Justices Jeevan Reddy and Agrawal also concluded that Article 74 (2) is limited to protecting the secrecy of the deliberations between the President and his Council of Ministers. Its scope cannot be read or understood as to override the basic provisions of constitution relating to judicial review.[22]

Insofar as Article 74(2) is concerned, the views are almost unanimous. Justices Varma and Dayal have also held that Article 74(2) is no bar to production of the materials on which the ministerial advice is based.[23] Justice Ramaswamy also concurs with the majority opinion on this point.[24] Justice Ahmadi although observes that since reasons would form part of the advice, the Court would be precluded from calling for their disclosure but he agrees that Article 74(2) is not a bar to the production of all the material on which the ministerial advice was based.[25]

Justices Sawant and Singh have left it open for the Union Government to raise the plea of privilege under Section 123 of the Evidence Act and have observed that when such privilege against disclosure is claimed, the courts will examine such claim within the parameters of the said section on its merits.[26] Justices Reddy and Agrawal also agree with the same.[27] Justice Ramaswamy has held that if the court after due deliberation and, reasoned order issues “discovery order nisi” the record is liable to be produced subject to the claim under Section 123 of Evidence Act to examine the record in camera.[28]Justices Verma and Dayal are also of the view that production of the materials is subject to the claim of privilege under Section 123.[29]

Justices Sawant and Singh also went on to hold that once the person challenging the proclamation makes out a prima facie case, the burden would be on the Union Government to satisfy that there exists material which showed that the Government could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Since, such material would be in exclusive knowledge of the Union, S.106 of the Evidence Act would come into operation and the burden of proving the existence of such material would be on the Union.[30] Justices Pandian, Reddy and Agrawal have also concurred to this view.

Though, the unanimous view was that judicial review was permissible, some members found that there was extremely limited scope of judicial review. In the opinion of Justice Ahmadi, which formed part of the minority decision, there is limited scope of judicial review in such cases the court cannot interdict the use of the constitutional power conferred on the President under Article 356 unless the same is shown to be mala fide. He reasoned that since the action is taken by the president over the report of the Governor or ‘otherwise’, it is difficult to predicate the nature of material placed before the President. Moreover, the president is required to record reasons for his subjective satisfaction, thus it would be difficult for to the courts to enter the political thicket to ascertain as to what inspired the political wisdom of the President to exercise his powers under Article 356. He agreed with the law laid down in the State of Rajasthan Case in this regard.[31]

The question as to what relief may be granted when a proclamation made under Article 356 is under challenge, was also before the bench for consideration. The unanimous view of the bench is that the court shall not interdict the issuance of the Proclamation or the exercise of any other power under the Proclamation. However, the members are of divergent opinions about whether the Court can by an interim injunction restrain the holding of fresh elections to the legislative assembly. The majority view expressed by Justices Sawant and Kuldip Singh is that Court can exercise this power to avoid judicial review being rendered fruitless.[32] Justices Reddy and Agrawal are also of the view that the court can stay the dissolution of the assembly but not in such a manner as to allow the assembly to continue beyond its original term and in such cases, the court shall also ensure disposal of the petition within two to three months.[33]

Regarding the grant of final relief, the majority has opined that if the proclamation issued is declared invalid, it will be open to the Court to restore the dismissed government to office and the legislative assembly, wherever it may have been dissolved or kept under suspension.[34]

The majority view is based on basic principles of fairness, justice and common sense. Once the proclamation is declared unconstitutional and consequential is not granted, it would clearly amount to conferring immunity to illegal action.

ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 356

The principle question before the Bench was the interpretation of Article 356. Article 356 provides that if the President, on report from the Governor of the State or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may issue a Proclamation assuming the powers of the state government and vest the powers of the state legislature in the parliament. The bench was to determine the nature, scope and extent of the power conferred upon the President under Article 356.

The bench has expressed divergent views regarding the nature, scope and extent of the powers provided under Article 356. Justices Reddy and Agrawal have observed that power conferred by Article 356 is a conditioned power, rather than an absolute power to be exercised in the discretion of the President. The precondition for exercising the power is formation of subjective satisfaction regarding existence of the situation contemplated under Article 356 on the basis of relevant material. The use of word “may” indicates not only discretion but an obligation to consider the necessity of the action. It also casts an obligation to consider which of the steps specified in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) should be taken and to what extent.[35] Their lordships have further observed that the power conferred by Article 356(1) is of an exceptional character and its misuse is bound to play havoc with our constitutional system. It is not a power conceived to promote the interests of the political party in power at the Centre.[36] Justice Pandian has concurred with these views expressed on by Justice Reddy.[37]

Justices Sawant & Singh point out that Article 356 forms part of Chapter XVIII of the Constitution which relates to emergency provisions. The common thread running through all these articles is that they could only be invoked in cases of emergency and that too of the nature contemplated under those Articles. Thus, existence of an emergent situation is necessary and Article 356 can be invoked only in exceptional circumstances.  Their lordships have also emphasized over the existence of sufficient objective material indicating that the Government of the State “cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution” A proclamation may only be issued under Article 356 only when the situation shows that the constitutional Government has become an impossibility.[38] Justices Reddy & Agrawal, however, have liberally interpreted the term emergency to mean a situation which is not normal, a situation which calls for urgent remedial action.[39]

The bench has also considered the necessity of conducting floor-test where support to the ministry is claimed to have been withdrawn by some legislators. Justices Sawant & Singh have observed that proper course for testing the strength of the Ministry is holding the test on the floor of the House and the floor of the House is the sole constitutionally ordained forum for seeking openly the claims and counterclaims in that behalf. The assessment of the strength of the Ministry is not a matter of private opinion of any individual, be he the Governor or the President. Their lordships have further observed that it is difficult to envisage a situation where it would not be possible to conduct a floor test. Although, if such a situation arises, it should be obligatory on the Governor in such circumstances, to state in writing, the reasons for not holding the floor-test.[40] The opinion of Justices Reddy and Agrawal coincides with on this point, who have observed that, wherever a doubt arises whether the Council of Ministers has lost the confidence of the House, the only way of testing it is on the floor of the House except in an extraordinary situation where because of all-pervasive violence, the Governor comes to the conclusion and records the same in his report that for the reasons mentioned by him, a free vote is not possible in the House.[41] Justice Ramaswamy has dissented on this issue and has observed that resorting to floor test would depend upon the prevailing circumstances and the Governor should be left free to deal with the situation in accordance with the Constitution and the conventions of the parliamentary system of Government.[42]

There are two conditions precedent to the issuance of the Proclamation: (a) that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and (b) the President should be satisfied either on the basis of a report from the Governor of the State or otherwise that such situation exists.

The bench has interpreted the meaning the phrase “Government of the state cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution”. As per Justices Sawant and Kuldeep Singh, it encompasses a situation in which the constitutional Government has become an impossibility. The word “cannot” emphatically connotes a situation of impasse. A situation which can suitably be remedied or does not disable or interfere with the governance of the State according to the Constitution, would not merit the issuance of the Proclamation under the Article.[43] Justices Reddy & Agrawal have also stressed that non- compliance or violation of the Constitution should be such as to lead to a situation where the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution.[44] Justice Ramaswamy has opined that the phrase “cannot be carried on” in clause (1) of Article 356 does not mean that it is impossible to carry on the Government of the State but it only envisages a situation has arisen where the Government of the State cannot carry on its administration in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.[45]

Article 365 of the Constitution contemplates one such situation where the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. It provides that failure to comply with any directions given in the exercise of the executive power of the Union under this Constitution shall be a situation in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. However, certainly it is not the only situation contemplated by the expression.[46] Justices Sawant and Singh have also relied upon the Report of the Sarkaria Commission on Centre- State relationship and have broadly concurred with the illustrative occasions[47] where Article 356 (1) may be invoked.[48] Justices Reddy and Agrawal have also observed that opinions expressed by the Sarkaria Commission are backed by an elaborate & exhaustive study of all relevant aspects and thus are certainly entitled to great weight.[49]

Justices Sawant and Singh have observed that even if the ruling party in a state suffers an overwhelming defeat in the Lok Sabha elections, it will not be a ground for the issue of the Proclamation under Article 356(1).[50] Justice Ahmadi has also observed in this regard that mere defeat of the ruling party at the Centre cannot by itself, without anything more, entitle the newly elected party which comes to power at the Centre to advise the President to exercise his power under this Article.[51]

The second condition of invoking Article 356 is regarding the satisfaction of the President. Justices Sawant and Singh after quoting the dictionary meaning of the word “satisfied”, have observed that satisfaction is not the personal whim, wish, view or opinion or the ipse dixit of the President dehors the material but a legitimate inference drawn from the material placed before him which is relevant for the purpose. The satisfaction of the president herein means that there is sufficient material before the President to indicate that unless a Proclamation is issued, it is not be possible to carry on the affairs of the State as per the provisions of the Constitution.[52] Justices Reddy and Agrawal have opined that use of the the words “is satisfied” indicates a more definite state of mind than is indicated by the expressions “is of the opinion” or “has reasons to believe“. Thus, the satisfaction has to be formed by the President fairly, on a consideration of the report of the Governor and/or other material placed before him.[53]

FEDERALISM

While interpreting the Article 356, the Bench has given some valuable insights on the concept of Federalism. Justice Ahmadi has explained the concept of federalism as a concept which unites separate States into a Union without sacrificing their own fundamental political integrity. Separate States, therefore, desire to unite so that all the member-States may share in formulation of the basic policies applicable to all and participate in the execution of decisions made in pursuance of such basic policies. Thus the essence of a federation is the existence of the Union and the States and the distribution of powers between them. Federalism, therefore, essentially implies demarcation of powers in a federal compact.[54] Over the nature of Indian Government, his lordship observes that Indian Constitution has, in it, not only features of a pragmatic federalism which, while distributing legislative powers and indicating the spheres of governmental powers of State and Central Governments, is overlaid by strongly ‘unitary’ features.[55]

Justices Reddy & Agrawal have analyzed various provisions of the constitution to explain the manner in which federalism has been adopted in the Indian Constitution. According to them, federal form of government has no fixed meaning and it broadly indicates division of powers between a Central Government and the States. In India, it was not a case of independent States coming together to form a Federation as in the case of USA. Our founding fathers wished to create a federation with a strong Union. In view of our historical experiences and diversity, it was a necessity. The bias towards the Centre can be seen in distribution of legislative heads. All the more important heads are placed in List I and several heads listed in List II are made subject to certain entries in List I to some extent. Even for heads listed in List III (Concurrent List), the central legislation is given primacy. Moreover, Article 3 empowers the Parliament to create new States out of existing States either by merger or division as also to increase, diminish or alter the boundaries of the States. In the process, existing States may disappear and new ones may come into existence. The only requirement, in this process, is prescribed by the proviso to Article 3, viz., ascertainment of the views of the Legislatures of the affected States. Article 249-251 further portray the primacy of Parliament. Rajya Sabha is empowered pass a resolution by 2/3 majority authorizing the Parliament to make laws in national interest with respect to matters of List II. During the period of Emergency also, the parliament is empowered to make laws regarding the subjects listed in List II. Under Article, 253 as well, the Parliament is empowered to make any law for giving effect to International Agreements. Financially also, the Centre has been placed at a higher pedestal, more sources of revenue have been granted to the Union as compared to the states. Clearly, Centre has been made far more powerful vis-a-vis the States. Correspondingly, several obligations too are placed upon the Centre including the duty to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance. The fact that our Constitution provides greater power to the Centre does not mean that States are mere appendages of the Centre and the Centre can be permitted to tamper with the powers of the State.[56] Their lordships tend to point out that with great power comes great responsibility. Since the Union has been conferred with wide powers, it is also obliged to exercise the powers with great care and caution.

Justice Pandian has opined that after great debate and discussions in the Constituent Assembly, the present form of Government, which is more federal in structure, came into being instead of a unitary Government.[57] Justices Sawant & Singh have observed that federalism is an essential feature of our Constitution and is a part of its basic structure. Dr. Ambedkar has also emphasized that notwithstanding the fact that there are several provisions in the Constitution where the Centre has been given powers to override the States, our Constitution is a federal Constitution. This implies that the states are sovereign in their domain and have complete authority to make any law for the peace, order and good governance of the State. States have an independent constitutional existence and are neither satellites nor agents of the Centre. Decentralisation of power is not only valuable administrative device to ensure closer scrutiny, accountability and efficiency, but is also an essential part of democracy. The fact that during emergency and in certain other eventualities their powers are overridden or invaded by the Centre is not destructive of the essential federal nature of our Constitution. The invasion of powers in such circumstances is an exception and not a rule. They have to be resorted to only occasionally to meet the exigencies of the special situations. [58]

Justice Ramaswamy has observed that Federalism envisaged in the Constitution of India is a basic feature. The Indian Constitutional framework provides for independence of the states in its exercise of legislative and executive power. However, being the creature of the Constitution the State has no right to secede or claim sovereignty. Both Union & States are coordinating institutions and ought to exercise their respective powers with adjustment, understanding and accommodation to render socioeconomic and political justice to the people, to preserve and elongate the constitutional goals.[59]

SECULARISM

The facts involved in the cases of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh gave rise to questions regarding the concept of Secularism in the Indian constitution setup. The bench has dealt with this elaborately and has studied the impact of Secularism in the Constitution. There is no disagreement with the major fundamental premise that secularism is a basic feature of the Constitution. Justices Reddy & Agrawal have observed that the expression “secular” is not capable of any precise definition and, thereafter, their lordships have endeavoured to ascertain its meaning in the context of our Constitution. Article 25 of the Indian Constitution guarantees freedom of religion. Articles 14, 15 and 16 enjoin upon the State to treat its citizen equally irrespective of their religion, caste, faith or belief. While the citizens of this country are free to profess, practice and propagate such religion, faith or belief as they choose, so far as the State is concerned, i.e., from the point of view of the State, the religion, faith or belief of a person is immaterial. To it, all are equal and all are entitled to be treated equally. Secularism is thus more than a passive attitude of religious tolerance. It is a positive concept of equal treatment of all religions. The 42^nd Amendment merely made explicit what was already implicit in the Constitution. Their lordships have condemned the amalgamation of religion and politics and have observed that under our Constitution, no party or Organisation can simultaneously be a political and a religious party. It has to be either. They also opined that if a political party espousing a particular religion comes to power, that religion tends to become, in practice, the official religion and thus other religions come to acquire a secondary status, at any rate, a less favourable position. This would be plainly antithetical to Articles 14 to 16, 25 and the entire constitutional scheme.[60]

Justice Ramaswamy has observed that freedom of faith and religion is not a bounty of the state but constitutes the very foundation on which our state is erected.[61] Justices Sawant & Singh have opined that secularism under our Constitution is that religion cannot be mixed with any secular activity of the State. Religious tolerance and equal treatment of all religious groups and protection of their life and property and of the places of their worship are an essential part of secularism enshrined in our Constitution.[62] Justice Ahmadi has concurred with views expressed by Justices Reddy, Sawant and Ramaswamy.[63]

VALIDITY OF THE PROCLAMATIONS UNDER CHALLENGE

Meghalaya: The bench was of the unanimous view that the proclamation issued with respect to Meghalaya was unconstitutional and was thus invalid. Justices Sawant & Singh have held that the Meghalaya episode shows the Governor’s unnecessary anxiety to dismiss the Ministry and dissolve the Assembly, and also his failure as a constitutional functionary to realise the binding legal consequences of and give effect to the orders of this Court. Their lordships further held that prima facie the material before the President was not only irrational but motivated by factual and legal mala fides. The Proclamation was, therefore, held invalid.[64] Justices Reddy & Agrawal expressed deep regret that the Governor of Meghalaya failed to give effect to the orders of the Apex Court and gave a strange logic that orders of this Court relating to the disqualification of members of the House is a matter between the Speaker and the Supreme Court.[65] The minority judgment has also held that the proclamation issued in Meghalaya case was vulnerable, however in view of fresh elections in the state; there was no occasion for granting any substantive relief.

Karnataka: The majority opinion of the bench was that the proclamation issued with respect to the state of Karnataka was unconstitutional and deserved to be struck down. Justices Sawant & Singh observed that the High Court erred in holding that floor test was not obligatory, in fact, in such cases floor test is the proper course to determine the strength of the ministry. Their lordships found that the proclamation was made hastily without considering the conflicting letters of the seven legislators and the High Court also failed to take note of this fact.[66] Justices Reddy & Agrawal also agreed that the Governor should have called upon the Chief Minister to prove his strength in the assembly. Their lordships also opined that though the Proclamation recites that the President’s satisfaction was based also on “other information received“, however the counter-affidavit of the Union does not state that any other information/material was available to the President. Thus, it was concluded that there was no other information available before the President and the words were put in mechanically.[67] As per the minority opinion the proclamation dissolving the assembly of Karanataka was not justiciable.

Nagaland: There was great divergence amongst the members of the bench with respect to the proclamation issued dismissing the Government and dissolving the assembly of Nagaland. Justices Sawant & Singh held in categorical terms that since no opportunity was accorded to Shri Vamuzo to prove his majority on the floor of the house, the proclamation was unconstitutional.[68] In this case there was difference of opinion in the division bench of the High Court and the case was referred to the third judge. Before he could pass any order, SLP was filed and the proceedings were stayed by the Supreme Court.  Justices Reddy & Agrawal observed that view taken by Justice Hansaria was correct, who had held that the material which formed part of ‘other information’ did not form part of the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President and the court is, therefore, entitled to see the said material. Thus, their lordships held that the High Court may consider the advisability of proceeding with the case in view of the fact that fresh elections have been conducted in the state.[69] Justice Pandian concurred with this view. While, in the opinion of Justices Verma, Dayal & Ahmadi, the proclamation was not justiciable. Justice Ramaswamy has expressed no opinion over the proclamation issued in Nagaland.

Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh: The bench was almost unanimous in its conclusion with respect to the proclamations issued in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh. Justice Ramaswamy held that satisfaction reached by the President in issuing Proclamation in these states cannot be faulted as it was based on the fact of violation of the secular features of the Constitution which itself is a ground to hold that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the States concerned cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.[70] Justices Sawant & Singh stressed on religious tolerance and secularism enshrined in our constitution along with the importance of national unity and integrity. Their lordships observed that credentials of the ministries of these states formed sufficient material to reach the satisfaction for invoking Article 356.[71] Justices Reddy & Agrawal observed that the demolition of the disputed structure was an extraordinary event which had threatened the secular credential of the nation. Their lordships further observed that it cannot be said that there was no relevant material before the president for issuing the proclamation, in view of the fact, that the report of the Governors revealed that the governments included persons who swore by the values and traditions of the RSS and were giving overt and covert support to the said organization. Thus, it was concluded that the challenge to these proclamations is liable to fail.[72] In the opinion of Justices Verma, Dayal & Ahmadi, the proclamation was not justiciable.

Majority Opinion

Though no order of the entire bench has been recorded in the judgment, concurrence and dissent has been expressed on certain points. After a perusal of the judgment, following points can be culled out as the majority opinion.

1. The validity of the Proclamation issued by the President under Article 356(1) is judicially reviewable to the extent of examining whether it was issued on the basis of any material at all or whether the material was relevant or whether the Proclamation was issued in the mala fide exercise of the power. When a prima facie case is made out in the challenge to the Proclamation, the burden is on the Union Government to prove that the relevant material did in fact exist, such material may be either the report of the Governor or other than the report.[73]
2. Article 74(2) does not bar the scrutiny of the material forming basis of the President’ satisfaction.[74]
3. The President cannot exercise his power under sub-clauses (a), (b) & (c) of Article 356 (1) to take irreversible actions, until both the houses approve the proclamation under Article 356(3). Thus, the President would also not be justified in dissolving the assembly through the Governor under Article 174(2)(b) read with Article 356(1)(a) until both the Houses of Parliament approve of the Proclamation.[75]
4. If the Court concludes that the proclamation is invalid, then notwithstanding the fact that it is approved by both Houses of Parliament, it will be open to the court to restore status quo ante to the issuance of the Proclamation and to thus, restore the Legislative Assembly and the Ministry.[76]
5. The court would also be empowered to grant interim injunction restraining fresh elections till the final disposal of the challenge to the validity of the proclamation. However, the court will not interdict the issuance of the proclamation or the exercise of any other power under the proclamation.[77]
6. While restoring the status quo ante, it will be open for the court to mould the relief suitably and declare as valid actions taken by the President till that date. It will also be open for Parliament and the Legislature of the State to validate the said actions of the President.[78]
7. Secularism is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The action of the State Government to subvert or sabotage secularism as enshrined in our Constitution would make it amenable to action under Article 356.[79]
8. The defeat of the ruling party in a State in the Lok Sabha elections cannot by itself justify invocation of Article 356.[80]
9. The Constitution of India has created a federation but with a bias in favour of the Centre. Within the sphere allotted to the States, they are supreme.[81]

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has certainly created a safeguard against the rampant misuse of Article 356 by means of its judgment in Bommai Case. Though it cannot be said that the abuse of powers under Article 356 has been completely done away with, yet misuse has been curbed to a great extent.

The President under Article 356 has literally been empowered to undo the will of the people of a State by dismissing the duly constituted Government and dissolving the duly elected Legislative Assembly. The great amplitude of this power itself must act as a warning against its frequent use or misuse. It must further be kept in mind that in a representative democracy in a populous country like ours when Legislatures are dissolved and fresh elections are proposed to be held, it imposes a huge burden on the public exchequer. The entire machinery and the resources of the State are diverted from other useful work.

The Bench has carefully considered the concepts of federalism and secularism with respect to the Indian Constitution. The application of federalism in Indian Constitution is unique in itself. In our constitutional framework, we have adopted federalism but with a powerful union in order to ensure smooth working of the nation. Unlike the USA, India was pre-existing and was a nation has deep historical roots. Hence, in the Indian Constitution, in contrast with other Federal Constitutions, the emphasis on the preservation of the territorial integrity of the constituent States is absent and the entire focus is on maintaining the national integrity. The Bench has considered it meticulously with regard to Article 356 and has concluded that the States have an independent constitutional existence and the President should not invoke Article 356 unless a clear case of constitutional failure is not made out.

The bench has unanimously held that secularism is part of the basic structure of the constitution. The bench has been on the same page while holding that any activity of the state government which seeks to subvert or sabotage secularism would attract invocation of Article 356.

In my humble opinion, the most important facet of this judgment is widening of the scope of judicial review, which is indeed very heartening. Judicial Review in fact is the greatest safeguard that the bench has provided for any misuse of Article 356. Though, it is a bit unfortunate that there was not unanimity on this, the majority opinion has given a broad and exhaustive scope of judicial review. In case, the majority opinion would have had kept the material beyond judicial review, it would have given a free hand to the Union to flagrantly misuse the provisions of Article 356.

A major missing in the judgment is an agreed upon order of the entire bench elucidating the views of the majority and the order of the court. Though, the view of the majority may be deduced from the respective judgments of their lordships, an agreed order would have provided much needed clarity and precision to the judgment.

There are certain issues over which the bench has not been able to reach to a consensus and there certain issues which have not been considered by all the members of the bench. One such extremely important issue is regarding giving an opportunity of floor test in cases where support to the ministry/ruling party has been withdrawn by some legislators. Justices Sawant, Singh, Reddy & Agrwal have categorically held that floor test is mandatory in such cases and it is obligatory on the Governor to ensure floor-test before sending his report to the President under Article 356. In case, a situation arises where it is not possible to conduct a floor-test, the Governor shall record reasons in writing for the same in his report. Justice Ramaswamy partly dissented and held that it is for the Governor to decide whether or not conditions are conducive to resort to floor- test. The other four members of the bench have not made any observations on this crucial aspect.

Another significant issue is of giving a warning to the state government before proceeding against it under Article 356. In the Constituent Assembly debate itself, Dr. Ambedkar had expressed his hope that a warning would first be issued to the erring province and only then Article 356 would be resorted to. The Sarkaria Commission also recommended that a warning should be issued to the errant State that it is not carrying on the Government of the State in accordance with the Constitution and before taking action under Article 356, its reply should be considered. Justices Sawant and Singh have endorsed the idea and have observed that the President should resort to a warning before proceeding to exercise the powers under Article 356(1). Justice Ramaswamy has partly concurred here and has held that the warning envisaged by Dr Ambedkar needs to be given in certain circumstances and failure to comply with the same would be obvious failure of the constitutional machinery. The other six members of the bench have refrained from giving any observation of this issue.

All in all, the Bommai Case is of great significance not only in curbing the misuse of Article 356 but also to the development of the Constitutional Law. The judgment has discussed some key concepts of Indian Constitutional Law viz. judicial review, federalism and secularism, in an elaborate manner.

The Bommai Case has been instrumental in exercise of judicial review in several later cases where the issue regarding invocation of Article 356 was raised.[82] Most recently, the Bommai Case was heavily relied on by the Uttarakhand High Court while quashing a proclamation issued under Article 356.[83] The judgment of the Uttarakhand High Court was substantially affirmed by the Apex Court.[84]

Insofar as misuse of Article 356 is concerned, an amendment in line with the Bommai Judgment and the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission is the need of the day. However, which union government would be willing to restrict its own power, remains the million dollar question.

[1] Pa 155, S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.

[2] Pa. 399-402, Ibid.

[3] Pa 124, 407-408, Ibid.

[4] Pa 125-127, 410-413, Ibid

[5] Pa 128, 414, Ibid

[6] Pa 129, 415, Ibid

[7] Pa 130, 416, Ibid.

[8] S. 93, Government of India Act, 1935.

[9] A Consultation Paper on Article 356 of the Constitution, National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, Advisory Panel on Union-State Relations under chairmanship of Justice R.S.Sarkaria.

[10] GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1935 (PROCLAMATIONS UNDER SECTION 93), available at < https://api.parliament. uk/ historic-hansard/commons/1940/apr/18/government-of-india-act-1935>, last accessed on March 30, 2020.

[11] Pa 11, Supra Note 1, See also Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IX, Page 177

[12] Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IX, Page 177

[13] Ibid, Page 151.

[14] The Indian Constitution- Cornerstone of a Nation, Granville Austen, Page 261-262.

[15] (1977) 3 SCC 592

[16] (1982) 1 SCC 271

[17] Pa 96, Supra Note 1

[18] Supra Note 16

[19] Pa 93, Supra Note 1.

[20] Pa 379, Supra Note 1.

[21] Pa 83, Supra Note 1.

[22] Pa 321, Supra Note 1.

[23] Pa 48, Supra Note 1.

[24] Pa 209, Supra Note 1.

[25] Pa 33, Supra Note 1.

[26] Pa 86, Supra Note 1.

[27] Pa 380, Supra Note 1.

[28] Pa 210, Supra Note 1.

[29] Pa 48, Supra Note 1

[30] Pa 87, Supra Note 1.

[31] Pa 35, Supra Note 1.

[32] Pa 153, Supra Note 1.

[33] Pa 290, Supra Note 1.

[34] Pa 114, 152, 291, & 434, Supra Note 1.

[35] Pa 280, Supra Note 1.

[36] Pa 372, Supra Note 1.

[37] Pa 8, Supra Note 1.

[38] Pa 58, 59 & 60, Supra Note 1.

[39] Pa 272, Supra Note 1.

[40] Pa 119, Supra Note 1.

[41] Pa 395, Supra Note 1.

[42]  Pa 263, Supra Note 1.

[43] Pa 60 & 75, Supra Note 1.

[44] Pa 281, Supra Note 1.

[45] Pa 218, Supra Note 1.

[46] Pa 77, Supra Note 1.

[47] Pa 6.5.01, Supra Note 9.

[48] Pa 82, Supra Note 1.

[49] Pa 295, Supra Note 1.

[50] Pa 105, Supra Note 1.

[51] Pa 31, Supra Note 1.

[52] Pa 60 & 74, Supra Note 1.

[53] Pa 280, Supra Note 1.

[54] Pa 14, Supra Note 1.

[55] Pa 24, Supra Note 1.

[56] Pa 274 – 276, Supra Note 1.

[57] Pa 4, Supra Note 1.

[58] Pa 96, 98, 99 – 102, Supra Note 1.

[59]  Pa 247, Supra Note 1.

[60] Pa 304 – 310, Supra Note 1.

[61] Pa 178, Supra Note 1.

[62] Pa 148, Supra Note 1.

[63] Pa 29, Supra Note 1.

[64] Pa 123, Supra Note 1.

[65] Pa 403, Supra Note 1.

[66] Pa 118 – 120, Supra Note 1.

[67] Pa 395 & 398, Supra Note 1.

[68] Pa 124, Supra Note 1..

[69] Pa 408 & 409, Supra Note 1.

[70] Pa 264, Supra Note 1.

[71] Pa 150 & 151, Supra Note 1.

[72] Pa 433, Supra Note 1.

[73] Pa 153(I) read with 2 & 435, Supra Note 1.

[74] Pa 153(II) read with 2 & 435, Supra Note 1.

[75] Pa 153(IV) read with 2 & 435, Supra Note 1.

[76] Pa 153(V) read with 2 & 435, Supra Note 1.

[77] Pa 153(VI) read with 2 & 435, Supra Note 1.

[78] Pa 153(VII) read with 2 & 435, Supra Note 1.

[79] Pa 153(VIII) read with 2, 434(10) & 435, Supra Note 1.

[80] Pa 3, 31, 82, 105 & 295, Supra Note 1.

[81] Pa 434 (9) read with 2, 96-98, Supra Note 1.

[82] Jagdambika Pal v. Union of India, (1999) 9 SCC 95; Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 1.

[83] Harish Chandra Singh Rawat v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Utt 502

[84] Union of India v. Harish Chandra Singh Rawat, (2016) 16 SCC 744